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RECENT CASES
Juvenile Law-Double Jeopardy-TRANSFER HEARINGS MUST BE HELD
PRIOR TO ADJUDICATION ON MERITS-Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
Unlike an adult, a juvenile who is charged with violating a criminal
statute may find himself prosecuted in one of two courts. If the juvenile
demonstrates that he is a proper subject for the rehabilitative treatment
provided by the juvenile justice system, he will be tried in the juvenile
court.' On the other hand, if by reason of the seriousness of the charge,
the nature of the juvenile's past record, and his social background, the
court finds that he is not amenable to treatment within the juvenile
system, he will be tried as an adult in the criminal court.2 The determi-
nation of where the juvenile will face prosecution is made in what is
1. The idea of rehabilitative treatment has spawned an entirely separate juvenile court
system throughout the United States. In the view of the early juvenile justice reformers,
the child was essentially good, and incapable of criminal responsibility. See Fox, Juvenile
Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970); Mack, The
Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909). Thus proceedings in the juvenile court could
not properly concern themselves with guilt or innocence. Rather, the state through the
juvenile court merely sought as parens patriae to determine a rehabilitative treatment
which would be in the child's best interests. Nationwide, juvenile court statutes reflect
the rehabilitative ideal by providing that, unless certain factors are met, the juvenile must
be tried in the juvenile court. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §707 (West Supp.
1976), which allows proceedings to continue in the juvenile court unless the court finds
that the juvenile is 16 years of age or older and "would not be amenable to the care,
treatment and training program available through the facilities of the juvenile
court.... Other state statutes presume proceedings will take place in the juvenile court
unless it can be demonstrated that to do so would not be in the best interests of the minor
or the public. See, e.g., Juvenile Court Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §702-7 (1975).
In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the Supreme Court held that juveniles faced with
adjudicatory hearings must be provided with the following procedural rights: notice of
charges, right to counsel, right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, privilege against
self-incrimination, right to a transcript of the proceedings, and the right to appellate
review. Id. at 31-58. The Gault Court was careful to point out that the addition of these
due process rights would not impair "any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile
process." Id. at 21.
2. While the rehabilitative ideal of the juvenile system is generally upheld, see note 1
supra, nearly every state has provided for waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction when the
juvenile appears to be an unlikely rehabilitative prospect. See M. LEVIN & R. SARRI,
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: A STUDY OF JUVENILE CODES IN THE UNITED STATES 19-23 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as LEVIN & SARRI]. For a discussion of the waiver criteria used in
California see Note, Double Jeopardy and the Waiver of Jurisdiction in California's Juve-
nile Courts, 24 STAN. L. REV. 874 (1972). See also L. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, 7 Cal.3d 592, 498 P.2d 1098, 102 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1972).
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frequently called a transfer hearing.3 Although nearly every state pro-
vides for some form of transfer hearing,' states have differed as to when
the hearing should take place.5 This lack of uniformity has stemmed
from a disagreement as to whether jeopardy attaches in a juvenile pro-
ceeding.'
In Breed v. Jones,7 the Supreme Court resolved this problem by hold-
ing that jeopardy attaches at the commencement of the adjudicatory
hearing. Thus, in order to avoid a violation of the constitutional protec-
tion against double jeopardy, the transfer decision must be made in a
separate hearing8 prior to any juvenile court adjudication of the offenses
3. Transfer hearings may be initiated by the state's attorney or the juvenile court. For
a breakdown of state statutes specifying how the transfer hearing is initiated see LEVIN &
SARRI, supra note 2, at 22-23. Some states allow the juvenile to initiate the transfer
hearing. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §39.02(b)(2) (1974); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §702-07(5)
(Supp. 1975). Trial in the criminal court may afford the juvenile tactical advantages such
as the right to a jury trial. LEVIN & SRaRI, supra note 2, at 23. Cf. McKeiver v. Pennsyl-
vania, 403 U.S. 529 (1970) (no right to jury trial in the juvenile court).
4. See generally LEVIN & SARRI, supra note 2, at 19.
5. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. §707 (West Supp. 1976) (the transfer
decision may occur at any time during or after the adjudicatory hearing); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 119, §61 (1969) (court may order the juvenile to be transferred after a
hearing on the complaint) (emphasis added); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §702-7(3) (1975)
(transfer decision must occur prior to any hearing on the merits of the offense charged).
6. Courts have differed as to whether jeopardy attaches to juvenile adjudicatory hear-
ings. Those finding that jeopardy attaches include: Fain v. Duff, 488 F.2d 218 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 999 (1975); Rice v. District of Columbia, 385 F.2d 976 (D.C.
Cir. 1967); Anonymous v. Superior Court, 10 Ariz. App. 243, 457 P.2d 956 (1969) (dictum);
People v. Int. of P.L.V., 176 Colo. 342, 490 P.2d 685 (1971); State v. Gibbs, 94 Idaho 908,
500 P.2d 209 (1972); In re J.J., 132 N.J. Super. 464, 334 A.2d 80 (1975); Funesca v. Judges
of the Family Court of the County of Kings, 59 Misc. 2d 492, 299 N.Y.S.2d 493 (1969);
Garrison v. Jennings, 529 P.2d 536 (Okla. Crim. 1974); In re Knox, 532 P.2d 245 (Ore. App.
1975); Collins v. State, 429 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App, 1968).
Lower courts holding that jeopardy does not attach to juvenile proceedings include:
Jones v. Breed, 343 F.Supp. 690 (C.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd, 497 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1974),
appeal afI'd, 421 U.S. 519(1975); In re Bradley, 259 Cal. App.2d 253, 65 Cal. Rptr. 570
(1968); Moquin v. State, 216 Md. 524, 140 A.2d 914 (1958); In re Juvenile, 306 N.E.2d
822 (Mass. 1974); State ex rel. Arbeiter v. Reagan, 427 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1968); Brooks v.
Boles, 151 W. Va. 576, 153 S.E.2d 526 (1967).
7. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
8. The California statute at issue in Breed allowed the juvenile court to make the
transfer decision at any time during the adjudicatory hearing. Statutes which expressly
require transfer hearings to be held prior to adjudication on the merits are: D.C. CODE
ENCLYC. ANN. §1-2307(d) (Supp. 1975); GA. CODE ANN. §24 A-250(a) (Supp. 1974); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 37, §702-7(3) (1975); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, §70-16(a) (1969); MICH. STAT.
ANN. §27.3178 (2) (Supp. 1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. §260.125 (1963); MIss. CODE ANN. §43-
21-31 (1972); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §10-1229 (Supp. 1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
BREED v. JONES
charged.'
Gary Steven Jones was adjudicated a delinquent for having
committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the
crime of robbery.' 0 Upon a subsequent finding that Jones was unfit for
treatment as a juvenile, the juvenile court ordered that he be prosecuted
for the same conduct in the adult criminal court." Thereafter Jones was
convicted despite counsel's argument that the criminal proceedings vio-
lated Jones' constitutional right against double jeopardy." Jones even-
tually petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court.
His petition was denied. 3 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed, '" holding that constitutional guarantees such as the right against
double jeopardy are so fundamental to notions of fairness that to deny
them would destroy confidence in the judicial system.'5
The Supreme Court, in affirming the Ninth Circuit, left the determi-
nation of the actual basis or criteria for the transfer decision to the
states. As to the necessary procedural rights to be accorded juveniles
during the hearing, the Court was content to rest upon its decision in
Kent v. United States.'" The Kent Court found the transfer hearing to
be a "critically important"' 7 portion of juvenile proceedings. It was re-
§169.21 (1964); N.M. STAT. ANN. §13-14-27 to 27.1 (Supp. -1975); N.D. CENT. CODE §27-
20-34 (1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §1112(b) (Supp. 1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §50-
325 (Supp. 1975); TENN. CODE ANN. §37-234 (Supp. 1975); TEX. FAs. CODE §54.02 (1973);
VA. CODE ANN. §16.1-176(2) (Supp. 1974); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §14-115.38 (Supp. 1975).
9. The Court stated:
We require only that, whatever the relevant criteria, and whatever the evidence
demanded, a State determine whether it wants to treat a juvenile within the
juvenile court system before entering upon a proceeding that may result in an
adjudication that he has violated a criminal law ....
421 U.S. at 537-38.
10. Id. at 521. See CAL. PEN. CODE §211 (West 1972).
11. 421 U.S. at 523-24.
12. Jones filed for habeas corpus relief in the juvenile court, and upon denial of that
petition, sought habeas corpus relief in the California Court of Appeal. Viewing the events
in the juvenile and criminal court as only one proceeding, the court found no denial of
Jones' constitutional right against double jeopardy. In re J., 17 Cal.App.3d 704, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 185 (1971). The Supreme Court of California denied Jones' petition for a hearing.
421 U.S. at 525.
13. The district court found that important distinctions between juvenile proceedings
and criminal trials justified denial of Jones' double jeopardy claim. Jones v. Breed, 343
F.Supp. 690, 696 (C.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd, 497 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1974), appeal aff'd, 421
U.S. 519 (1975).
14. Jones v. Breed, 497 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1974), aff'd, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
15. Id. at 1165.
16. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
17. Id. at 556.
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quired to measure up to the "essentials of due process and fair treat-
ment.""' At the hearing juvenile defendants were thus guaranteed the
right to counsel, the right of access to social records and probation
reports, and the right to a written statement of reasons for the juvenile
court decision."9 Unfortunately, the rationale set out in Kent was not
uniformly followed by lower courts; indeed, many simply limited its
reach to an interpretation of a District of Columbia statute'" and thus
evaded the due process requirements of Kent."'
Although Breed affirmed the procedural protections established in
Kent, it did not entirely rectify defects in the substance of the transfer
hearing. Transfer hearings have been criticized as being merely sum-
mary procedures in which little attention is paid to relevant information
pertaining to the juvenile's background, his amenability to treatment,
and other factors.2 In fact, many courts have upheld the validity of
18. Id. at 562.
19. Id. at 557.
20. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. §16-2307(d) (Supp. 1975).
21. Although it can be argued that the Kent decision is limited to "the construction of
a statute applicable only to the District of Columbia," 383 U.S. at 568, the Court in In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), emphasized the broad reach of the Kent opinion. In deciding
whether due process protections should apply to juveniles faced with adjudicatory hear-
ings in the juvenile court, the Court referred to Kent: "Although our decision turned upon
the language of the statute, we emphasized the necessity that 'basic requirements of due
process and fairness' be satisfied in such proceedings." Id. at 12, citing Kent v. United
States,- 383 U.S. at 533. Despite the Gault Court's assertion that standards of basic
fairness should apply regardless of the particular juvenile court statute involved, many
lower courts narrowly limited the due process reach of Kent. See, e.g., United States ex
rel. Bombacino v. Bensinger, 498 F.2d 875 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1019 (1974);
Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 869 (1973); Holmes
v. State, 224 Ga. 553, 163 S.E.2d 803 (1968); People v. Sprinkle, 56 Ill.2d 257, 307 N.E.2d
161, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 935 (1974).
22. See generally THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINIS-
TRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME (1967)
[hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT] which states:
The substance behind the procedure .. .remains unrecognized for what it
really is: Not a scientific evaluation of whether the youth will respond success-
fully to a juvenile court disposition, but a front for society's insistence on retri-
bution or social protection. . . .Determining amenability to treatment involves
evaluation of such qualities as criminal sophistication, about which information
is difficult to acquire and harder to assess.
Id. at 24-25. For a discussion of some "impermissible" factors which enter into a juvenile
court judge's decision to transfer see Note, Juvenile Court Waiver: The Questionable
Validity of Existing Statutory Standards, 16 ST. Louis U.L.J. 604 (1972). See also CHICAGO
LAW ENFORCEMENT STUDY GROUP, DISCRETION IN JUVENILE JUSTICE: STUDY OF TRIAL OF
JUVENILES AS ADULTS IN COOK COUNTY, April 1975 (unpublished manuscript on file with
Urban Affairs Office, Evanston, Ill.) (factors which enter into the transfer decision may
.[Vol. 25:783
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statutes which set out "the best interest of the child" as the sole crite-
rion for the transfer decision.2" Such a nebulous standard is difficult for
even the most thorough and efficient juvenile court judge to apply.'
In addition to the Court's deferral to the states to establish appropri-
ate criteria for the transfer decision, the Court gives little guidance as
to the quantum of evidence of the crime charged which must be intro-
duced to support a transfer decision. Apparently, use of either probable
cause or substantial evidence receives the Court's support. 5 Although
enough evidence is needed to insure that the state's charge is not frivo-
lous,"e evidence of the crime charged should not play a major role since
include race, the quality of legal representation, and the presence or absence of an adult
co-defendant, as well as several "legitimate" factors).
23. Statutes allowing transfer if it would be in "the best interest of the child" have been
held not to violate due process by virtue of being unduly vague. Generally, courts have
found that the purposes behind the juvenile rehabilitative system provide sufficient guides
for juvenile court judges in the transfer decision, and the due process requirement of a
written statement of reasons for the transfer protects the juvenile from arbitrary and
discriminatory decision-making. See, e.g., Clemons v. State, 317 N.E.2d 859, 861 (Ind.
C.A. 1974). But see United States ex rel. Bombacino v. Bensinger, 498 F.2d 875, 878 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1019 (1974) (due process does not require a juvenile to be
given a written statement of reasons for the transfer decision). For state court decisions
upholding statutes challenged for vagueness see Briggs v. United States, 226 F.2d 350
(D.C. Cir. 1955) (statute contained no standards for transfer determination); L. v. Supe-
rior Court of Los Angeles County, 7 Cal.3d 592, 498 P.2d 1098, 102 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1972)
(no standards); In re Juvenile, 306 N.E.2d 822 (Mass. 1974).
24. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 22, considered and rejected various alternatives to
the transfer proceeding. These included proposals such as lowering the juvenile court age
limit to 16 and eliminating waiver entirely, or creating an intermediate court to deal with
youths from 16 to 21. Id. at 25. The Task Force concluded that "waiver may well be a
necessary evil, imperfect but not substantially more so than its alternatives." Id. The
Report noted that "reasons and procedures for waiver have typically been vague if enunci-
ated at all," and observed that "effort should be made to make it [transfer] as fair and
frank as possible." Id.
25. We note that nothing decided today forecloses States from requiring, as
a prerequisite to the transfer of a juvenile, substantial evidence that he commit-
ted the offence charged, so long as the showing required is not made in an
adjudicatory proceeding. .. . The instant case is not one in which the judicial
determination was simply a finding of, e.g., probable cause. Rather, it was an
adjudication that respondent had violated a criminal statute.
421 U.S. at 538 n.18.
26. Because of the grave sanctions which face the juvenile in criminal court, the state
should not be able to conceal its case from the juvenile in order to compel a guilty plea.
See Carr, The Effect of the Double Jeopardy Clause on Juvenile Proceedings, 6 U. TOL.
L. REv. 1 (1974):
If the clause requires non-disclosure of the prosecutor's full case in juvenile
court, weaknesses will be known to him alone and hidden from the juvenile and
the court. This concealment, in turn, provides the prosecutor with a substantial
19761
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the issue to be determined at the hearing is ultimately the juvenile's
amenability to rehabilitation as opposed to his culpability. Addition-
ally, introduction of considerable evidence of the crime, especially if this
is the sole issue contested in the transfer hearing, may subject the juve-
nile to the equivalent of two adjudicatory proceedings.27
The transfer hearing is a critical stage in the juvenile proceeding"
because it will result in a choice between two entirely different models
of treatment: punishment in the criminal court versus rehabilitation in
the juvenile court." Although this distinction may at times appear to
be a matter of form over substance, it is important to realize that the
theory of rehabilitative treatment is recognized by the courts as a means
by which a.juvenile may limit or challenge the conditions of his confine-
ment."' Transfer to the criminal court means that a juvenile may be
opportunity to obtain pleas to the delinquency petition where he is aware that
his case presents problems on proof. As long as he is limited to and can meet
the minimal standard of probable cause, he can either threaten or institute a
transfer proceeding as a coercive tactic to compel a plea.
Id. at 49.
27. On the theory that the transfer hearing is a non-adjudicatory proceeding, courts
have generally rejected arguments that in a transfer hearing, introduction of evidence of
the crime committed is a bar to subsequent criminal prosecution. See, e.g., People v.
DePoy, 40 Ill.2d 433, 240 N.E.2d 616 (1968); People v. Wilson, 7 Ill.App.3d 158, 287 N.E.2d
211 (1st Dist. 1972). On the other hand, courts have recognized that use of such evidence
tends to make the hearing somewhat adjudicatory in nature. The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, in a case decided after Breed, rejected a juvenile defendant's arguments
that in a transfer hearing introduction of evidence of the crime charged barred later
prosecution in criminal court for the same conduct. However, the court recognized that
its decision, as well as Breed, only succeeded in eliminating "technical jeopardy."
[Wihile Breed eliminated what might be termed the technical double jeopardy
problem of subjecting a juvenile to two adjudicatory proceedings, it does little
to alleviate the practical problem of twice subjecting a juvenile to the strain of
marshaling his resources against the state.
Stokes v. Commonwealth, 336 N.E.2d 735 (1975). See also United States ex rel. Bomba-
cino v. Bensinger, 498 F.2d 875 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1019 (1974), where the
Seventh Circuit observed that the Illinois statute did not require the prosecutor to show
probable cause in the transfer hearing, and "had evidence of that character been pre-
sented, it might have had the effect of commencing an adjudicatory proceeding, thus
barring subsequent criminal prosecution." Id. at 878 n.11.
28. The critical nature of the transfer decision was noted both in Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. at 556, and Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. at 535. See also Powell v. Hocker, 453 F.2d
652 (9th Cir. 1971); Kemplen v. Maryland, 428 F.2d 169, 174 (4th Cir. 1970).
29. See note 1 supra.
30. See, e.g., Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tex. 1973). The district court
issued a preliminary injunction to enjoin practices in schools supervised by the Texas
Youth Council because they were in violation of the juvenile's right to treatment which
was found to be based upon the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. For a
[Vol. 25:783
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incarcerated beyond his minority," and that in capital cases he may face
the death penalty." Conviction in a criminal court means a criminal
record, perhaps involving substantial loss of rights in adulthood.13
The Court's decision not to define standards for the transfer hearing
may be attributable in part to its newly articulated fear of administra-
tively overburdening the juvenile court system. Breed is the first juve-
nile due process decision which has deliberately weighed the value of
adding new constitutional rights for juvenile defendants against the
resulting cost and burden incurred by the juvenile court system.3 4
Prior to Breed the criteria used by the Supreme Court to determine
the applicability of due process rights to juvenile proceedings included
whether the right was essential to due process and fair treatment, 3
whether it would prejudice the uniquely rehabilitative purposes of the
juvenile court system," whether the right would be of assistance in the
discussion of this case and the constitutional right to treatment generally see Note, The
Establishment of a Constitutional Right to Treatment for Delinquent Children, 26 BAYLOR
L. REV. 366 (1974). See also Long v. Powell, 388 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (finding
that commitment of a juvenile to an institution known to be inadequate in providing
juvenile rehabilitation was fundamentally unfair).
31. All proceedings under the juvenile court acts, including incarceration of the juve-
nile, terminate when the juvenile reaches the age of majority. See, e.g., Juvenile Court
Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §705-11. See generally BESIAROV, JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVOCACY
173-83 (1974); TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 22, at 4.
32. Had the Supreme Court upheld the procedure in the District of Columbia whereby
juveniles are transferred to criminal courts, Kent might have faced the death penalty. 383
U.S. at 554 n.17. But cf. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 239 (1972) (death penalty, as
applied, is unconstitutional).
33. Criminal conviction and arrest records may severely limit an individual's job oppor-
tunities and credit possibilities, and may eliminate altogether his right to vote. See THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 75 (1967) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION].
34. For factors entering into prior Supreme Court decisions which have applied due
process rights to juvenile proceedings see notes 35-38 and accompanying text infra. Al-
though not mentioned by the majority, the dissent in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
528 (1971), suggests that administrative cost was not far from the Court's consideration.
Id. at 561-62. See also Ketcham, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania: The Last Word on Juvenile
Court Adjudications?, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 561 (1972).
35. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent
v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
36. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Winship. 397 U.S.
358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Compare McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
528, 545 (1971) (court finding that addition of jury trial right would disrupt beneficial
aspects of juvenile system by changing juvenile proceedings into an adversary process),
with Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 535 (1975) (court finding that giving double jeopardy
protection to juvenile courts would not diminish flexibility and informality of the juvenile
court system).
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factfinding process,"7 whether it was commonly granted in many juris-
dictions, and whether the opinions of experts justified inclusion of the
right in such proceedings." The Breed opinion, in addition to consider-
ing most of these factors, examines the expected costs of granting pro-
tection against double jeopardy .3
With the caveat that)the judiciary should not impose on the juvenile
court requirements which would "so strain its resources as to endanger
its unique function,""0 the Court found several ways to justify the added
costs of holding transfer hearings prior to adjudicatory hearings. Since
the reasons for or against transfer will be recognized quickly in most
cases, the hearing will occupy a small amount of the juvenile court's
time, thus necessitating only a minor commitment of resources.,, Re-
sources used to hold the transfer hearing prior to adjudication are coun-
terbalanced by the result that, after transfer, no further proceedings are
required in the juvenile court. 4" In addition, there are currently a large
number of jurisdictions which already require that the transfer hearing
take place prior to the adjudicatory hearing, and they are performing
the task with no major inefficiencies. 3 Finally, the Court found that in
instances where transfer hearings had been held and transfer rejected,
the elimination of the threat of a criminal prosecution would render the
juvenile more willing to admit the charge against him, thus dispensing
with the need for time-consuming adjudicatory hearings.4
The Breed rationale reaches more deeply into the administrative con-
cerns of the juvenile court than any other juvenile due process case
37. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). See generally Rudstein,
Double Jeopardy in Juvenile Proceedings, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 266, 267 (1972).
38. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545-46, 548 (1971) (TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 22, and state statutes used to support decision that imposition of right
to jury trial in juvenile proceedings would retard rehabilitative goals); In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 37-41 (1967) (right to counsel in adjudicatory hearings supported by evidence from
court decisions, experts, and legislatures).
39. 421 U.S. at 533-39.
40. Id. at 537.
41. Id. at 538. Petitioner Breed had argued that the requirement of a transfer hearing
would produce three hearings in every juvenile case:
Thus, the preliminary fitness or transfer hearing will add a third hearing in
every juvenile court case where transfer is considered and rejected, whereas only
two hearings-jurisdictional and dispositional-need be held if transfer may be
constitutionally treated as a dispositional alternative.
Brief for Petitioner at 40, Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
42. 421 U.S. at 539.
43. Id. at 538.
44. Id. at 539. The Court supplies no basis for its assertion that the juvenile will be more
likely to plead guilty after transfer is rejected.
[Vol. 25:783
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decided previously. Although there is a hint of such a concern in prior
Supreme Court opinions," it does not reach fruition until Breed. Indeed,
the Breed Court seems to be making every effort to expose and resolve
every conceivable burden that might be incurred by its decision.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has often held that a state's concern
with efficiency and speed cannot outweigh constitutional values." It
would be startling indeed if the courts were to deny due process rights
in criminal proceedings on the grounds of administrative burden." Yet
the Court in Breed appears to be ready to accept such arguments in the
context of juvenile adjudicatory proceedings.
More than one third of the persons apprehended for crime in this
country are juveniles. 8 Courts and experts have uniformly recognized
that a lack of resources has stymied the rehabilitative goals of the juve-
nile system.49 If the Court should use that same premise of lack of
resources and administrative overload to limit further expansion of juve-
nile due process rights, the juvenile will be locked in an impossible trap.
He gets neither the procedural advantages accorded an adult nor the
rehabilitative treatment he is entitled to as a juvenile.
The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment is now, after
Breed, fully applicable to juvenile proceedings. Breed, at first glance,
may be construed as another decision in the tradition of In re Gault,50 a
tradition which has steadily expanded juvenile due process rights. On
closer scrutiny, however, it becomes clear that the cost and burden of
these rights looms larger and larger in the Court's consideration. The
Court's deference to the states to define the appropriate criteria for the
transfer decision is one indication of its desire to avoid the additional
expenditure of juvenile court resources. Nevertheless, in light of the
45. See note 34 supra.
46. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (state's interest in speed and
efficiency cannot outweigh the putative father's right to a hearing on his fitness as a
parent); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (state's interest in speed and efficiency
cannot outweigh welfare recipient's due process right to an evidentiary hearing before the
termination of benefits).
47. In the adult criminal context, administrative concerns surface when the court de-
cides that the proceeding in question is "not part of a criminal prosecution." Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972). See also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (no
constitutional right to counsel at parole revocation hearing because it would impose direct
costs and serious collateral disadvantages).
48. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS 184-87 (1974).
49. See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1966). See also PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 79-81.
50. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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Court's growing recognition of the criminal nature of juvenile proceed-
ings,5' it can hardly be expected that more time, cost and effort will not
be asked of the juvenile justice system in the future.
Miriam N. Geraghty
Settlements-Loan Agreements as Settlement Devices-AFFIRMATIVE
DUTY TO DISCLOSE LOAN AGREEMENT TO THE COURT AND TO THE REMAINING
DEFENDANTS-Gatto v. Walgreen Drug Co., 61 Ill.2d 513, 337 N.E.2d 23
(1975).
The Illinois Supreme Court approved loan agreements as a method
of apportioning liability for damages between joint tortfeasors in the
1973 case of Reese v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R.I Two years later, however,
in Gatto v. Walgreen Drug Co.,' the court reevaluated its position on
loan agreements and imposed limitations as to their use. Unfortunately,
the court did not consider all of the problems which are inherent in these
agreements. This Note will argue that the court should extend its Gatto
holding to void loan agreements as against public policy because they
undermine the adversary system and because they shift liability be-
tween joint tortfeasors without respect to culpability.
A loan agreement is one of many methods of apportioning liability
between joint tortfeasors in Illinois tort actions. Contribution, 3 an in-
51. The Breed Court, noting the failure of the juvenile justice system to live up to its
benign ideals, cited with approval prior Court responses which have been "to make applic-
able in juvenile proceedings constitutional guarantees associated with traditional criminal
prosecutions." 421 U.S. at 528-29.
1. 55 Ill.2d 356, 303 N.E.2d 382 (1973). In Reese, plaintiff sued the railroad and crane
manufacturer for the death of her husband, a railroad employee. The railroad entered into
a loan agreement/covenant not to sue and was dismissed before trial. A verdict was
entered against the crane manufacturer, and the trial court set off the amount paid by
the railroad against the verdict, holding that the agreement was a covenant not to sue and
therefore deductible. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court decreed that the amount paid
by the railroad was a loan and could not be set off against the judgment amount. The
court held that loan agreements were a valid settlement tool in Illinois. To avoid the
possibility of undermining the adversary process, the court held further that loan agree-
ments could be admitted into evidence, and cross-examination would be allowed to estab-
lish a witness' knowledge of the agreement.
2. 61 Ill.2d 513, 337 N.E.2d 23 (1975), petition for cert. filed sub nom Gatto v. Calumet
Flexicore Corp., 44 U.S.L.W. 3494 (U.S., Feb. 18, 1976) (No. 75-1173).
3. Contribution is the allocation of payment of a judgment between joint tortfeasors.
